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Abstract: “Self-driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots Roam,” reads a New York Times article of 
March 19th, 2018, one day after the accident. The fundamental problem of artificial intelligence has always been 
how the robot stops; not how to make the robot walk, say “Hello!” or “Good Morning!”; do things so complicated as 
to make us mumble in awe: “Wow!”, but rather how not to act, how not to say “Hello!” at the right, or rather wrong 
moment. What is this moment? How can it be found? This paper asks such questions in the context of design and 
architecture: How does architecture stop? How do we close a design process, or choose among different design 
variations? Such concern for stopping has persisted in history, even if it has been eclipsed by what could be called, 
perhaps redundantly, the ideology of self-generation. Architects are always busy discoursing about generation, how 
architecture should come about, by itself, NOW! Upon close inspection, however, we find that the desire for stopping 
has been there all along, creeping from between the building blocks of architecture, undermining the absolutism of 
self-generation. From the projectiles of Vitruvius foundering in mud to the ‘hermaphrodite’ forms of Ronchamp, and 
today, in our deceptively fluid digital age, there are architects who have paid as much attention to stopping as they 
have to generation. The paper highlights instances of stopping in history, from Perrault to Paul Valéry and the digital. 
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INTRODUCTION
“We think in generalities, but we live in detail.” (Whitehead 
1926, 192)
How does architecture stop? How do we make design 
choices? How was such a question addressed in the 
past? One of those fascinated with stopping was Paul 
Valéry, a thinker whose aesthetics intersected with Le 
Corbusier’s, yet one who is either misunderstood or 
rarely mentioned in architectural discourse.2 Valéry was 
fascinated with seashells, how their form stops through 
a “combination of rhythm and indivisible movement:”
But suddenly an end must come. This strange torsion must 
cease, the nacre on the inside and the coarser covering 
must join, and the distinction between the two substances 
of the shell must vanish or explain itself, while at the same 
time its form must be completed by some decision that 
remains to be arrived at . . .. The architect knows only his 
rule and square. The musician does pretty much as he 
pleases. The poet proceeds by leaps and bounds. But 
nature has preserved her cautious methods, the inflection 
in which she envelops her changes of pace, direction, or 
physiological function. She knows how to finish a plant, 
how to open nostrils, a mouth, a vulva, how to create a 
setting for an eyeball; she thinks suddenly of the sea shell 
when  she has to unfold the pavilion of an ear, which she 
seems to fashion the more intricately as the species is 
more alert. (Valéry 1977, 111-112; italics added).
Architects have come a long way from the rule and 
square. Today, with the aid of digital technologies, 
one can generate forms with a complexity and speed 
unimagined up until three decades ago. Yet it is 
precisely today that the question of stopping erupts with 
full force: Where do you stop? How do you select the best 
out of hundreds of iterations? While the answers vary, 
they all share the ethos and hubris in thinking that one 
can and ought to provide an answer to such question; 
they all frame stopping as a problem of knowledge, one 
that demands principles or criteria NOW! for a process 
whose closure, in Valéry’s terms, is enabled by a delayed 
decision … Stopping is an event that is found in (a) 
process, rather than an epistemological problem that 
can be solved, in general. Yet knowledge as an epistemic 
domain at a particular historical moment matters insofar 
as it demands and structures the way we endeavor 
to provide an impossible answer to the ‘problem’ of 
stopping. While stopping is structured by such demand, it 
is always found outside the domain of knowledge. 
1. THE NATURAL VERSUS THE CUSTOMARY   
The question of stopping precedes the digital. It is asked 
most urgently at those moments of breaks and crisis, 
but also liberation, that define modernity. For example, 
the 17th century’s querelle between François Blondel and 
Claude Perrault on whether certain proportions were 
transcendentally or empirically beautiful is one such 
moment. What is at stake in this debate is nothing other 
than the question of knowing where and how to stop at 
the very moment of a shift of emphasis from inherited 
knowledge to one constructed or generated by the 
subject.3  Perrault’s ingenious ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ 
was to provide both a constant and variable concept, 
or a positive and arbitrary beauty.  If the former is “very 
apparent and consists in the relationship the parts have 
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collectively as a result of the balanced correspondence 
of their size, number, disposition, and order,” the 
latter was what “appears agreeable not by reasons 
within everyone’s grasp but merely by custom and the 
association the mind makes between two things of a 
different nature” (Perrault 1993, 40-51). 
Perrault’s theory has a double ‘fail-safe’ feature: 
on the one hand, the eye of the mind can positively 
recognize the beauty of proportions. If the eye fails 
(to stop…), then the empirical tradition corrects our 
judgment through a (potentially infinite) table of 
proportional values developed over time. However, 
as Rudolf Wittkower recognized, this doubling of 
judgement opens up the door toward relativism. In 
Architectural Principles he lamented that proportions 
had become infinite: “Les proportions, c’est l’infini – 
this terse statement is still indicative of our approach” 
(Wittkower 1971, 153). Albeit, Wittkower contributed 
himself to such relativization, when he described the 
Palladian Villas as customary variation governed by a 
positive knowledge: geometry.    
In “The Mathematics of the Ideal Villa,” Rowe 
discerns the same geometrical ghost underlying 
Palladio’s Villa Malcontenta and Le Corbusier’s Villa 
Stein at Garche.4 He argues that in Malcontenta the plan 
exhibits ‘natural’ beauty through its abstract shape, while 
the facades exhibit ‘customary” beauty through the Ionic 
order. At Garche it is the facades that exhibit the ‘natural’ 
as “virtues of a mathematical discipline,” while the plan 
demonstrates the ambiguous ‘customary’ beauty: the 
‘arbitrary’ free movement, curved walls and framed 
views (Rowe 1976, Ibid., 9). Here, the design choice or 
stopping belongs to the ‘customary’, while it is held in 
check, as it were, by the ‘natural’.5 Aldo Rossi proposed 
a similar distinction between typology as natural and 
constant and morphology as customary and variable 
(Rossi, 1982, 116). Alan Colquhoun distinguished 
between form which applies to “a configuration with 
natural meaning or none at all,” and figure which refers 
to “a configuration whose meaning is given by culture” 
(Colquhoun, quoted by Peter Rowe, 1994, 177). Though 
less explicitly, Greg Lynn saw the spline as natural 
insofar it was generalized by a topological continuity, 
and the baroque curve as only customary insofar as 
it consists of “segments of multiple discrete radial 
elements.” (Lynn 1999, 20).
In Design Thinking Peter Rowe subsumes stopping 
under “a problem space [with] knowledge states, some 
of which represent solutions to a problem” (Rowe 1994, 
51) This ‘natural’ is represented as a tree whose nodes 
are stopping points. But where does the tree metaphor 
stop?6 In Design Thinking in Digital Age Rowe, while 
arguing (or hoping?) that the digital provides “a clearer 
view of suitable stopping rules” he also provides the 
disclaimer that “there is no in-principle guarantee that 
this would be the case” (Rowe, 2017, 59).7 One can stop 
only on the level of detail and the customary. Why is 
stopping not possible from with-in knowledge?
2. VALÉRY AND EUPALINOS
That is, Valéry answers, because there is “no way 
to measure knowledge except by the real powers it 
confers. I know only what I know how to handle” (Valéry 
1977, 126). The object of representation is already 
the representation of the object. The ‘problem’ of not 
knowing where to stop is our knowledge’s freedom to 
produce representation of objects in respect to form:  “If 
I have undertaken to produce one particular form, it is 
because I could have chosen to create entirely different 
ones . . ..” (Valéry 1977, 120-121). Elsewhere, Valéry 
writes that we can stop only by acting “directly on the 
freedom of the system of our esprit … we simply wait for 
the desired effect to present itself … we can do nothing 
but wait. We have no means to achieve in ourselves 
exactly what we want to obtain” (as cited in Guerlac 
1997, 102). What does this ‘waitingwait’ entail? 
Eupalinos or the Architect provides a way out of this 
infinite variation. Often misunderstood as a celebration 
of Platonic thought the play provides an inversion of 
such thought.8 Socrates, uncharacteristically cast with 
doubt for a man who presumably knew everything, is 
eternally damned to wonder like a ghost without finding 
its body, its closure, its finitude, without knowing where 
to stop. He is ‘paying for his sin’, which, to paraphrase 
Nietzsche vis-à-vis Derrida, is the sin of never having 
written.9 The book is a passage from Socrates to 
Eupalinos, from the thinker to the maker, from geo-
metry as an idea in the mind to a geometry mediated by 
objects and techniques. Phaedrus confronts Socrates 
with the story of a maker “of a strange versatility” who
thought that a ship should . . . be created by the 
knowledge of the sea, and should almost be fashioned by 
the very wave itself! . . . He sought therefore for the form a 
hull should have if the bottom was to remain more or less 
constant, whether the ship rolled from side to side – or 
danced in any other way about some center . . .. He would 
draw strange figures which for him made visible the secret 
properties of his float; but for my part I could see in them 
nothing in the least like a ship. (Valéry 1932, 82-83).
Through these ‘strange’ figures the constructor would 
try to
imitate the perfection of the swiftest fishes . . . their fishy 
thoughts . . . steering towards their destiny according to 
whim; and then their live mastery in the heart of storms! 
It was as though he himself felt their well-adapted forms 
conducting from head to tail, by the quickest way, the 
waters which lie in front of them, and which must be put 




The design process is a dis-position or tendency that 
progresses in and through obstacles:
if no obstacle impedes your progress, progress is 
quite impossible . . . once the necessary obstacle is 
present, it works against you; it drinks up your fatigues, 
parsimoniously metes out to you space in time. Here the 
delicate act of the artist intervenes in the choice of a form: 
for the form has to take from the obstacle what it requires 
in order to advance, but must only take what least checks 
the mover. (Valéry 1932, 84, italics added).
Valéry’s conclusion is that knowledge can only be 
measured by powers outside itself. One can know 
through what one does not know how to handle. One 
can stop not when knowledge abstracts obstacles but 
only when obstacles abstract knowledge. 
3. A HOUSE FOR TWO STRANGERS 
The project A House for Two Strangers is shown 
below as an example a design process marked by 
Process: Paper model Process: Paper model & Drawing
Process: Watercolor & drawingProcess: Watercolor & drawing
Process: Digital modeling & drawing
Process: Digital modeling & drawing
Figure 1: House for Two Strangers, designed by Skender Luarasi 
2003
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ENDNOTES
1 This paper has emerged from my dissertation “Where Do You Stop? A Critical Inquiry into Style, Geometry and Parametricism 
in History,” received at Yale University in 2018. It is also a snapshot of the emerging introduction of my future book: On the Art of 
Stopping: A Critical Inquiry into the Problem of Stopping in the work of Le Corbusier, which is currently in progress.
2 Niklas Maak is one of the few to provide an authoritative account on the relationship between Paul Valéry and Le Corbusier’s work. 
(See: Maak, 2011)
3 On the relationship between knowledge as generation and modernity see: Helmut Muller-Sievers, Self-Generation: Biology, 
Philosophy, and Literature Around 1800, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). On the relationship between modern knowledge 
as construction and geometry see: David Rapport Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry: A Genealogy of Modernity, (New York: 
Routledge, 1989). For a reference of these texts in architectural discourse see: Detlef Mertins, “Biocontructivisms,” in Modernity 
Unbound, (London: Architectural Association Publications, 2011), p. 161.
4 Anthony Vidler has argued that if Wittkower uses geometry to construct the historical object, then Rowe uses it to construct the 
“post-modernist object” (Vidler 2013, 79).
5 Vidler has argued that Rowe’s framework would stand “both as the model for design approach, as in the work of the New York 
Five, and as the paradigm for contemporary formalism to work against, as in the digital practices of Greg Lynn” (Vidler 2008, 86). It 
can be shown, however, that digital practices rely and expand on such model. 
6 One of the reviewers of this paper commented that “trees are not metaphors but are parts of mathematical structures of lattices, 
partial orders, posets, chains, etc.” I use the term metaphor in the strict sense of the model. On the topic of metaphors and models 
see: Max Black’s Models and Metaphors, 219-243, and Paul Ricoeur’s The Rule of Metaphor, 239-246. The argument is that “with 
respect to the relation to reality, metaphor is to poetic language what model is to scientific language (Ricoeur, 1977, 240).
7 I explore this topic the question of stopping in more detail in: “Making the Donkey Drink Water: An Inquiry into the ‘Problem’ of 
Stopping in the Digital Age,” in [Un]Timley Architecture, edited by Ingrid Mayrhofer-Hufnagl, to be published by Transcript in 2020.
8 As Niklas Maak correctly points out, Eupalinos “embodies an ironical approach typical of its author, using a Platonic dialogue to 
oppose Plato” (Maak 2011, 121).
9 Jacques Derrida quotes Nietzsche: “Socrates, he who does not write,” in Of Grammatology, trans Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 6
intercalated moments of stopping. This process is not 
a ‘construction tree’ with ‘knowledge states’, but rather 
a chain of obstacles entrenched into one another. Each 
of these states is either a potential stopping moment or 
another rhizomatic bifurcation. The variable curvature is 
actualized with different digital and analogue techniques 
which perform as obstacles of one another: paper, 
pencil drawing, watercolor, photoshop, physical models 
and digital modeling. The project, which is based on 
Samuel Becket’s Waiting for Godot, folds around a path 
that is doubled in the exterior and the interior. The path 
connects the spaces of the two main characters of the 
play, while also connecting the house to that outside 
from which Godot is expected to arrive. Vladimir and 
Estragon wait for Godot, but God-ot never appears. 
Godot’s absence, which is necessarily infinite, triggers 
a toggling process between the two, one that yields 
closure for the two tormented souls (figure 1).
CONCLUSION
How does the increase in computational speed 
affect stopping? It is more difficult to stop in a digital 
context because, to paraphrase Valéry, the non-relation 
between form requirements such as material and size 
increases. This liberation of form is similar to André 
Leroi-Gourhan’s rather ‘scandalous’ argument about the 
liberation of hands from locomotion and nourishment, 
a liberation that privileged gesture and speech, and 
consequently the evolution of the brain. The latter 
“was not the cause of developments in locomotory 
adaptation but their beneficiary” (Leroi-Gourhan 1993, 
26). The more developed the technology is, the ‘blanker’ 
the page is, less criteria to justify form there are; freer 
our mind and hands are; more difficult it is to stop; 
more relevant the question of stopping becomes. What 
new ‘brain’ does this liberation call? If we are on the 
verge of a “homo cyberneticus” relieved from the task 
of remembering (Cache 2011, 24), then what will this 
liberated brain be capable of thinking? In order to see 
whether such forecast is a tendency in the making or 
just an illusion, further research of the design processes 
must be undertaken, particularly by emphasizing 
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